A REPRESENTATIVE MARKET MODEL OF FARMLAND BID PRICES by Pederson, Glenn D.
A  Representative  Market Model  of
Farmland Bid Prices
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A  land bid-price  model  is  formulated  which  integrates  asset pricing  models  from
prior studies to illustrate the singular and joint effects of ordinary and capital gains taxes,
growth  of  returns,  diseconomies  of  size,  and  risk  behavior  on  farmland  prices.  An
application  of the model to primary data from cash grain farms illustrates that the ceteris
paribus effect of increased  marginal tax rates on a perpetual,  growing income stream is to
increase  its present  value.  Larger farms  in  higher  marginal  tax brackets  are shown  to
have  a competitive  advantage  over smaller,  lower  tax bracket  farms.
Analytical  efforts  to  explain  land  prices
have  employed  capital  theory  through  the
use  of asset  pricing  models  which  capitalize
the  anticipated  flow  of returns  from  owner-
ship  and use  of farmland.  While the concept
of discounted  present  value  is  generally  ac-
cepted  by agricultural  economists,  specifica-
tion of asset pricing models  has been an area
of  some  recent  controversy  [Baker,  Scott,
Adams,  Harris  and Nehring].  These and  oth-
er  studies  have  incorporated  taxes  (ordinary
and  capital  gains),  growth,  and  risk  into  in-
come  capitalization  models  in  an  attempt  to
more  adequately  relate investor decisions  to
market  price  changes.  Independently,  these
models  have  generated  conflicting  results
concerning  the effect of taxes on the ability of
farmers  to effectively bid for land.  This paper
illustrates  the theoretical  models  developed
by Harris and Nehring and later by Baker can
be integrated  into a single model.  The inte-
grated land bid-price  model incorporates tax-
es,  growth and risk, and extends  the analytic-
al capacity of the prior models.  The model is
applied  to North  Dakota  cash  grain farms  of
various  sizes  to  illustrate  the  singular  and
joint  effects  of these variables.
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Variations  in Model  Specification
Variations  between  suggested  capitaliza-
tion  models  can  be  viewed  as  two  related
issues  selection  of variables  and  level  of
analysis.  Individual-investor  present  value
models relate the price of land to a particular
investor's returns,  tax bracket,  cost of capital,
and  holding  period  and  may  or  may  not
incorporate  risk.  Bid-price  models provide  a
conceptually  broader  framework  than  pre-
sent  value  models  for  investment  decision
making.  In  addition  to the  factors  identified
above,  the  bid-price  varies  with  the  per-
ceived level  of risk in the anticipated  stream
of returns,  the decision  maker's  risk prefer-
ences,  the  degree  of  risk  currently  in  the
investor's  portfolio,  and  the  covariance  be-
tween returns to currently-owned  assets  and
returns to the asset being acquired  (Adams).
A necessary  condition for the bid-price to  be
equivalent  to present value  is that the inves-
tor be either  risk neutral or that the asset to
be acquired have no discernible effect on the
riskiness  of his  portfolio.  Adams  suggested
that investors  commonly lack at least some of
the  required  information;  they,  therefore,
concentrate  upon present values.
Market  models,  in contrast with individu-
al-investor models,  are present value models
due to obvious problems of aggregating indi-
vidual investor  risk preferences  and portfolio
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characteristics.  A  representative  market
model,  in which representative  land  market
participant  characteristics  are  specified,  can
conceptually generate  useful comparative bid
prices.  A  representative  market  model  pro-
vides  a framework for analyzing the competi-
tive positions  of a number of investors,  each
exhibiting representative financial and/or be-
havioral  characteristics,  under  various  as-
sumptions about policy variables  and market
conditions.
Harris  and  Nehring  attempted  to  show
with the aid of a bid-price model that farmers
operating larger farming units did not possess
the  greatest bidding  advantage.  It was  sug-
gested  that  the  combination  of  higher  tax
rates  and  diseconomies  of farm  size  reduce
the competitive  position  of the largest  farms
under  assumptions  of  either  risk-averse  or
risk neutral behavior.
Adams  later  showed  that  the  Harris-
Nehring  model  incorrectly  present  valued
the  after-tax  income  stream  using  a  before-
tax discount rate.  Adams also concluded  that
in  the  absence  of  capital  gains  taxes,  the
impact  of ordinary  taxes  on  a perpetual  in-
come  stream,  such  as  from indefinitely  held
farmland,  can  be  safely  ignored.  Income
streams which  are finite,  however,  are  effec-
tively reduced at higher tax rates.  Progressiv-
ity  of  the  income  tax  adversely  affects  the
bidding  potential  of a  few  high  tax  bracket
investors,  but  need  not  similarly  influence
investors  at other levels  of taxable income.
Baker's  market  model  incorporated  ordi-
nary  income  taxes,  capital  gains  taxes  and
exclusion of a percentage of long term  capital
gains  to  analyze  their joint  impact  on  land
prices.  Tax  effects  on  ordinary  returns  and
capital  gains were  evaluated  by allowing the
terminal  value of land to  change  as  tax  vari-
ables  were  adjusted.  The  model  assumed  a
growing  stream  of  returns  and  an  infinite
sequence  of landholders,  each  with  a finite
holding period.  A present value could, there-
fore,  be  computed  without  necessarily
specifying the value of land at the end of each
successive  holding  period.  An  application  of
the  model  to  the  Indiana  farmland  market
indicated that farmers in higher tax  brackets
could  pay  more  for  land  than  the  implied
average market price.  Moreover,  as the mar-
ginal Federal income tax rate increased it was
shown that,  the price an individual  could pay
increased,  regardless  of initial  tax bracket.
A set of major conclusions  drawn from  the
analyses  of the  above  models  can  be  sum-
marized.  A ceteris paribus  increase in the tax
rate  will;  1) decrease  the value of a constant,
finite income  stream,  2) not affect  a constant,
perpetual income  stream,  but 3) increase  the
present  value  of an increasing  perpetual  in-
come  stream.  These  conclusions  follow from
the development  of each  model under vari-
ous  parameter  specifications  and  assump-
tions.  Conclusions  1 and 2  can be generated
by  an  asset  pricing  model  which  includes
ordinary  income  tax  rates,  sets  the  growth
rate  on  returns  equal  to  zero,  assumes  a
discount  rate  equal  to  the  after-tax  rate  of
return  for  the  risk  class  of  the  asset,  and
varies the holding  period from a finite  num-
ber of years  to  an  infinite  number  of years.
Conclusion  3 relates to a model which makes
the same discount rate assumption and incor-
porates  a positive  rate  of growth in returns,
ordinary  income  and long term  capital gains
taxes,  and  allows  for  a  perpetual  holding
period.  One  of the  problems  with  the  per-
petual  holding  period  assumption,  as  it  has
been  applied  to  individual-investor  models
(see Harris  and  Nehring),  is that  it does  not
fit  well  with  what  is  observed  in  the  land
market (Scott).  An  assumption  of an infinite
sequence  of buyers,  each with  a finite  hold-
ing period,  is a better approximation  to what
is  observed.
Integrating the Models
In this  section it is shown that a represent-
ative  market  model  can  be formulated  from
the models developed  by Harris and Nehring
and by Baker.  It begins  by defining the price
of land  at the  individual  investor  level.  The
current  value  of farmland  to an  individual  is
defined  as  the  present  value  sum  of the  ex-
pected after-tax return,  R,,,  which is assumed
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to  grow at an annual rate,  g,  over an m-year
holding period,  plus the after-tax liquidation
price:
m




V1-c  (V1 -Vo)
(1  + r)m
where,  Vo is the present value sum,  Vi is  the
value  at  the  end  of the  holding  period,  r  is
the after-tax  nominal  discount  rate,  and  c  is
the  investor's  capital  gains  tax  rate  which
equals  40  percent  of  the  ordinary  income
marginal  tax  rate.  The  value  of farmland  at
the end  of the first holding period  (m-years,
hence) can  be similarly be expressed  as:
m








where,  V2 is  the  value  at  the  end  of  the
second buyer's holding period,  and all  other
terms are  as defined  above.
If one  extends  the value concepts  of equa-
tions  (1) and  (2) over  an infinite  sequence  of
buyers,  each  having the same  before-tax  dis-
count rate, m-year holding period,  and expe-
cations  of returns and growth of returns, the
problem  of specifying  the value of land at the
end  of  each  successive  holding  period  is
avoided  [Baker].  Although  the  infinite  se-
quence  of  landholders  implies  a  horizon
which is  equivalent to  that for a single inves-
tor and an infinite holding period,  the result-
ing present  value  expression  is  expected  to
generate  different  values  as  the  assumed  fi-
nite holding period for an individual-investor
varied.  Equation  1 can  be  rewritten  to  ex-
press  the present  value sum  as  a function  of
the  growth-adjusted,  after-tax discount  rate,
r*.
m  R
(3)  Vo =  m  - )
n=1  (1+r*)n
+  V1-c  (V  - Vo)
(1 + r)
T m
where,  (1 + r*)= (1  + r) / (1 + g),  and  r  is  an
after-tax  interest rate.
Under  the  above  assumptions,  Baker  has
shown  that  the  implied  sequence  of  land-
holders can be used to define a present value
for  land.  The  derivation  of a  present  value
expression  involves  several  intermediate
steps beyond  equation (3) and is shown in the
Appendix.  Annual  returns  grow  geometri-
cally with the holding  period as  the number
of  landholders  is  increased.  Since  the  land
price  for  the first  owner is  a function  of the
discounted  annual returns and the change  in
price  over the holding  period,  Baker derives
a parallel  expression  for the  i-th owner.  The
present value of the future stream  of returns
to  the first owner  is  shown to be recursively
related to the annual returns stream for the i-
th owner. The value of land at the end of each
successive  holding period  is deferred  to the
end of the subsequent holding period. In this
way  the  present  value  of the  price  of land
when  sold  at  the  end  of this  long  sequence
eventually  becomes  negligible  (a  common
assumption  of  the  capitalization  of  income
method).  The present  value of land  is  then a
function  of the  expected  annual  return  and
several  parameters  (tax  rates,  the  annual
growth  rate,  a pretax  nominal  interest rate,
and the holding  period).
A  simplified  expression  for  the  present
value  of land for the first  owner is,
(4)  Vo= - R o 1
r*
1-(1-r*)-
c(  + r*) m -(1 + r)-m  J
Equation  (4)  incorporates  the  ordinary  in-
come  tax  and  annual  growth  of returns  im-
plicitly,  and the  long  term  capital  gains  tax
rate  explicitly.  The  effect  of  including  the
capital  gains  tax  is  to  reduce  the  present
value of land.  When the capital gains  tax rate
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(c)  is  excluded,  the  bracketed  expression
equals  unity.  However,  when  the  capital
gains  tax  rate  is  included  the  condition that
r  r*  for  zero  or  positive  rates  of  growth
would  reduce  the  bracketed  expression  to
less  than unity.
Several  alternative  values  could  be  con-
sidered  for the  rate  of growth  of annual  re-
turns  (g)  and the  nominal  after-tax  discount
rate  (r)  in  equation  (4).  Certain  ranges  are
relevant.  The  tax-adjusted  discount  rate  is
positive  (O<r*<r)  when  the  growth  rate  is
between  zero and the value of r (which is the
expected condition).  Yet, r* could be positive
even  though  g  is  slightly  greater  than  r. 1
Growth  of  annual  returns  could  even  be
slightly  negative  and  yield  a  value  for  r*
which  is  less  than  r,  but  still  positive.  Two
special cases  could also be considered.  When
g=0,  r* = r,  and  equation  4  reduces  to
Vo = Ro/r,  which  is the familiar  capitalization
formula  for  a  constant  after-tax  stream  of
returns  discounted  at  an  after-tax  nominal
discount  rate.  The  second  special  case  as-
sumes  that  g= r,  which  implies  that  r* =0.
This latter case is not likely.  While the rate of
growth  of  annual  after-tax  returns  may  ex-
ceed the nominal after-tax discount rate tem-
porarily,  the  expected  relationship  (which is
relevant here) is that the discount rate would
exceed  the  growth  rate  over  a  prolonged
period  of time.
The relationship  between  the ordinary  tax
rate  and the  price  of land  is  positive  within
the  relevant  ranges  of the following  parame-
ters:  length of holding period,  annual growth
rate,  and  nominal  pretax  discount  rate
[Baker].  Higher  tax  brackets  are  directly
related to  higher present values  of farmland.
Higher tax rates reduce the after-tax  discount
rate  to  more  than  offset the  implied  reduc-
tions  in  after-tax  ordinary  and  capital  gains
income, and increase the present value of the
capital  gains  exclusion.
The  theoretical  basis  for  defining  a  bid-
price for a risky  asset has been suggested  by
'Baker  shows  that  g  could  exceed  r by  up  to  one-half
percent and  still have a limiting present  value of zero.
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Pratt.  The maximum bid-price, b,  is part of a
more general  utility function,  U(X),
(5)  U(X)=E  U (X+c-b)
where,  X  is  the  level  of assets  held  by  the
investor,  cr  is  the  value  of  the  risky  asset
being  considered,  and  E  is  the  expected
value operator.
Harris and Nehring used this utility frame-
work to  show that the bid-price  for land  can
be approximated  as a function of the expect-
ed  value  of future  income  from  an  acre  of
land,  E(y),  the variance  of income,  cr 2(y),  and
the measure of local risk aversion,  r(x). In this
case  y  is  the  annual income  stream  and the
measure  of local  risk  aversion  is  a  concave
function  of the  level  of net  worth.  The pre-
sent value  of an acre of land was theoretically
defined  using  a  dividend  growth  model
which  assumes  a  single  infinite  holding
period and  excludes  capital  gains  considera-
tions.  Substituting  the  theoretically  equiva-
lent  present  value  expressions  of  expected
income  and  the  variance  of income  for  the
present  value  of  land,  the  bid-price  ex-
pression  Harris and Nehring (p.  162) derived
was,
(6)  b=d E(y)-
r(x)
±  [[r1  d2  2(y)]
where,  d=(1-r) / (i-g), t  is  the  marginal
income  tax rate,  i is  a discount rate  for pure
time preference,  and g is the expected rate of
growth  of after-tax  income.
Utilizing the framework provided by equa-
tion  (6),  a bid-price  for  land  can  be  defined
which  incorporates  capital  gains  taxes  and a
finite  holding period  for the  investor.  Using
the  present  value  expression  for  an  acre  of
land from equation  (4),  the expected  present
value  price  of land  can  be defined as,
(7)  b=  E(Vo)
E(R,)  k
r*
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where  the  parameter,  k,  is  equal  to  the
bracketed  right  side  expression  in  equation
(4).  Similarly,  the  variability  of the  present
value  price  of land can  be written  as,
(8)  2(VO)=  k2 ()
Substituting  equations  (7)  and  (8)  into  equa-
tion  (6)  in  place  of the  terms  derived  using
the dividend growth model yields the follow-
ing bid-price  expression,




T 2(R)  k2  ½1
r*2 J
Equation  (9)  defines  the maximum  bid-price
for a risk nonneutral investor. The equivalent
expression for the risk neutral  investor is  the
same as  shown  in equation  (7).
An  evaluation  of the  qualitative  relation-
ships  between  the  bid-price  and  the  model
variables  reveals  that  most  aspects  of  the
model  are  unchanged  from  those  shown  by
Harris  and Nehring (pp.  162-3).  The effect of
the  tax  rate  variable  is,  however,  no longer
ambiguous and must be expanded  to include
capital  gains  tax considerations.  Tax rate  in-
creases influence the bid-price in three ways.
The price  increases due  to a reduction  of the
after-tax nominal market rate of interest.  Sec-
ondly,  the  exclusion  of a percentage  of long
term capital gains has a positive effect on land
bid prices,  as  has been discussed  above.  Ad-
ditionally,  the  bid-price  increases  as  the
variability  of after-tax income  is  reduced.
Equations  (7)  and  (9)  integrate  existing
models into a representative market model of
land prices.  The resulting model extends  the
applicability  of prior  models  to  the  issue  of
ability  of farmers  in  different  size  classes  to
competitively  bid  for  farmland.  Tax  effects,
ordinary  and capital  gains,  are  incorporated.
The  model  is  applicable within  a risk frame-
work.  Effects of economies and diseconomies
of size  can be  explicitly  considered  within  a
risk framework.
Methodology
Data from cash grain farms in north central
and  northwest  North  Dakota  were  selected
to  make  an application  of the model.  Finan-
cial records for 76 farms of various sizes were
retrieved from the Production  Credit Associ-
ation's AGRIFAX  record  system.  Cash grain
operations  were  defined  as  those  receiving
more than 75 percent of annual gross receipts
from  sale  of crops.  Farms  were  categorized
into  four  size  groups  according  to  average
tillable  acres  operated.  Tillable  acres  was
used as  the  criterion  for classifying  farms  in
recognition of the theoretical relationship be-
tween  number  of  cultivated  acres  and  unit
costs in production  of grain.  Acreage  bounds
were  defined  arbitrarily  based  upon  logical
breaks  between  farms  in  the  reported  acres
operated.  Characteristics  of those cash  grain
operations,  by size,  are  shown  in Table  1.
Farm physical  and financial  data for  1978
and  1979  were  used  to  compute  two-year
individual  and  group  averages  of farm  size,
net worth,  and average before-tax net returns
per acre.2 Federal  marginal  tax rates  shown
in  Table  1  reflect  estimates  derived  from
farm  income  records.  Annual  taxable income
for  each  farm  operation  was determined  by
subtracting total farm operating expenses  (in-
cluding  depreciation  taken)  from  total  cash
farm  income and adding in reported nonfarm
income.  The standard  deduction for a family
of four  was  then  subtracted  from  net  cash
income  to  provide  an  estimate  of  taxable
2Pooling two years of information on each farm provided
more  stable  estimates of net income and  also  reduced
the  effect  of errors  in  measurement  or  valuation  of
grains  held  in  inventory  for  later  sale  on  net  income
estimates.  Resulting  estimates  reflect  to  a greater  ex-
tent  the  typical  recent  income  position  of cash  grain
farms  in that  area  of the  state.  Cost  estimates  used  in
computing  before-tax  net returns  exclulde  land costs.
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income,  and the marginal  tax bracket.3 Mar-
ginal  tax  rates  reported  in  Table  1 are  size
class  averages.
Parameters of the model were  estimatd by
several  means.  The annual  rate of growth  of
returns per acre was estimated by computing
the rate of increase  in annual  gross cash  rent
for  the state  as  reported  by the  USDA.  The
rate  of growth for  the  1970-1980  period  was
estimated to be 9  percent.  A nominal  pretax
discount rate  equal  to  18.2 percent  was  de-
termined  by  solving  Equation  (4)  for  the
pretax interest rate which would just yield an
estimated  average  market  value  of $346 per
acre,  holding the  other variables  constant  at
the  mean  values  for  all  farms. 4 Holding
3A market value of $346 per acre is the price implied by a
6.35  percent  rate  of return  from  average  cash  rent
figures  reported  for that area of the  state  for  1978 and
1979  (USDA).  Average  cash  rent was  equal  to  $21.95
per acre on land rented for wheat and barley during that
two-year period  (Johnson).  A critical assumption  incor-
porated into the model is that the pretax interest rate is
the same for the first buyer,  across  all  sizes of farm and
for all  successive  investors.
4The  method  used  to  compute  average  annual  taxable
income  uses a net income concept which  is  equivalent
to the Census  of Agriculture  definition  used by  Harris
and  Nehring  (p.  164).  Investment  credit  was  not de-
ducted in the taxable  income computations.
periods  between  10 and  25  years were  used
to generate bid prices  to reflect average  long
term  holding periods  and illustrate sensitivi-
ty of the model  to  this parameter.
Effects  of Risk Preferences
A  bid  price  model  such  as  this  is  highly
sensitive  to  the  risk  aversion  parameters
which  are  specified.  Due to the  lack of em-
pirical  evidence  concerning  the  relevant
ranges for measures  of local risk preferences,
a range  of arbitrary,  yet reasonable  parame-
ters  were  utilized  to  generate  land  prices
under  conditions  of risk.5. In their  study  of
program  participation  by  a  representative
5The composite  utility function approach  used by Harris
and Nehring (p.  166)  could not be used to  determine a
single,  risk  aversion  parameter  for  each farm  class  for
two  reasons.  First,  that function  was  computed  using
net  worth  as  the  independent  variable.  Net  worth
figures  for  farms  reported  in  Table  2  generally  lie
outside  the  range of observations  reported in the  1974
study by Lin, Dean, and Moore, which would make the
estimated function unreliable.  Second,  estimated  utility
functions  generally  tend to  be highly  unreliable  (King
and Robison).  Since a range of risk aversion  parameters
is preferred  to capture  the effect of risk preferences  on
bid prices,  the measure of absolute risk aversion will be
ranged  over several  parameter  values  which generally
correspond  with  values  selected  by  Musser  and
Stamoulis.
TABLE  1.  Selected  Characteristics  of Northwest  Central  North  Dakota  Cash  Grain  Farms,
1978-79.
Size Class  of Farm
Item  Large  Medium  Small/Medium  Small
Number of  Farms  17  14  26  16
Average  Farm  Size (Acres)  2981  1717  1244  850
Range of  Farm  Size (Acres)  (2028-5160)  (1506-1964)  (1087-1463)  (600-1047)
Average  Net Worth  ($000)  560.2  418.7  262.2  219.6
Range of  Net Worth  ($000)  (112.3-1739.7)  (58.6-929.7)  (37.9-600.1)  (45.1-929.7)
Average  Net Income  Per Acre  ($)  22.78  23.19  19.46  16.96
Standard Deviation  of  Net
Income Per Acre ($)  11.24  13.12  9.52  8.05
Coefficient  of Variation  .493  .566  .489  .475
Marginal  Federal Income Tax
Rate  .33  .27  .25  .21
284
December 1982Farmland  Bid Prices
Georgia  farm,  Musser  and  Stamoulis
specified a range of risk aversion parameters
to capture  the  effect  of risk  preferences  on
resource  allocation.  Risk  averse  behavior  of
investors  in their  land purchasing  decisions
was assumed in this study. Hence,  bid prices
were estimated by parameterizing the coeffi-
cient  for  risk  aversion.  Bid  prices  and  risk
premiums  generated  at  each  level  of  risk
aversion  are intended to be illustrative of the
impact  of risk within the model.
Gradual increases  in the  risk aversion  pa-
rameter  result in decreases  in the maximum
bid-price and corresponding  increases  in the
risk premium as shown in Table 2.  Assuming
risk  neutral  behavior  for  all  farms,  larger
farms are able  to outbid farms in the adjacent
lower  size class.  This occurs  for either of two
primary  reasons;  1) there  exists  a higher  ex-
pected net income per acre,  or 2) the  larger
farm is in a higher tax bracket  so the after-tax
discount  rate  is  lower.  Both factors  generate
greater  present  values  of farmland.  As  the
risk  aversion  parameter  is  increased  uni-
formly  across  all  farms,  the  risk  premium
increases  for the large and medium  size rep-
resentative  farms  at  a faster rate  due  to  the
higher  variability  of income.  The  medium-
size  farm  is  unable  to  outbid  the  small-
/medium-size  farm when  the risk parameter
equals  .004.  Subsequent increases in the risk
parameter produce  an advantageous  bidding
position  for  the  small/medium  and  small
farms.  The  more  rapid  decline  of the  bid-
price  for  the  medium-size  farm  is  largely
attributable  to the higher coefficient  of varia-
tion  of net returns per acre.
A  comparison  of bid  prices  was  made  as-
suming decreasing  absolute risk aversion as a
function of average net worth. The composite
utility  function  developed  by  Harris  and
Nehring  (p.  166)  was  applied  to  the  North
Dakota cash grain  farm class data.  Bid prices
computed  by  size  of  farm  were;  $424.91
(large),  $355.58  (medium),  $287.14  (small-
/medium),  and  $235.14  (small).  Computed
risk  premiums  were;  $32.40  (large),  $44.40
(medium),  $34.50  (small/medium),  and
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farms  generally  place  higher  bid  prices  on
land  than  smaller-sized  farms  under  a  situa-
tion of diminishing  absolute  risk aversion.
Price Differentials  by Farm Size
Bid prices  are  directly  affected by  the as-
sumed length  of holding  period as  shown  in
Table  3  under  the  assumption  that  land
values  do  not  grow  independently  of  the
growth  in  annual  returns  (e.g.,  speculative
bidding).  Longer  holding  periods  result  in
higher  bid  prices  for  all  size  farms,  ceteris
paribus. As  the  holding  period  is  reduced,
however,  the  decline  of  bid  prices  is  not
uniform  either  in  absolute  or  percentage
terms.  Also,  as the length of holding period is
shortened uniformly for all farms,  the spread
between  maximum  bid prices  is reduced be-
tween farm sizes.  A reduction  of the holding
period  reduces  the  number  of periods  over
which  the  greater  tax  advantages  for  large
farms  are  compounded.  Hence,  the present
value of the tax differential  between farms  is
reduced.  As  the length  of holding  period  is
expanded,  the effects  of differences  between
the  rate  of growth  of annual  returns and the
discount rate become  a more significant  fac-
tor in both land  prices  and  bid price  differ-
entials  between  farms.  For  example,  if the
expected  growth  rate  were  to  exceed  the
effective  discount rate for a prolonged period
of time,  the ceteris paribus effect of a longer
holding period would be to  raise land values
for all farms and increase the bid price spread
between  farm  classes.  A  comparison  of bid
TABLE 3. Bid  Prices for North  Dakota  Cash
Holding  Periods.a
prices  for  a  given  farm  size  reveals  that  a
direct,  but decreasing relationship  exists be-
tween  the  bid-price  and  assumed  holding
period.
Bid-price  differentials  between  farm  sizes
have a number  of other potential  sources  in
the land market.  Table 4 provides for a com-
parison  of  the  factors  in  the  model  which
affect  the  bid  price  for  farmland,  assuming
either  risk  neutral  or  risk  averse  behavior.
Class  comparisons  are  made  assuming  that
the first-listed  class  of farm  (e.g.,  large)  had
the  tax  and  income  characteristics  of  that
sized-farm,  and the  characteristic  of the sec-
ond-listed class of farm (e.g., medium) shown
in the  source  column.  For  example,  a  large
farm  could bid $457.40 per acre,  if it had all
large  farm  characteristics  and  was  risk  neu-
tral.  That same  farm  could bid  only $392.92
($64.48 less),  if it had the lower tax bracket of
the  medium-sized  farm unit.  Comparison  of
bid  price  differentials  between  risk  averse
and risk neutral situations indicates that price
adjustments  are  generally  smaller  when
farms are  assumed to exhibit  a uniform  level
of  risk  aversion.  Downward  adjustment  of
the marginal  federal  income  tax rate  in  con-
junction  with  the  elimination  of the  capital
gains tax provision  results in a smaller down-
ward  adjustment  of the  bid  price.  Elimina-
tion  of the  effect  of capital  gains  tax  provi-
sions  involves  two  adjustments  within  the
model:  1) the  60  percent  long  term  capital
gains  exclusion  is  eliminated,  and  2)  capital
gains  go  untaxed.  Higher  bid  prices  which
Grain  Farms  by  Size  Class  Assuming Various
Holding  Period (in  years)
Farm
Size  Class  25  20  15  10
Large  $375.65  $369.37  $361.14  $350.32
Medium  314.50  311.40  307.20  301.47
Small/Medium  285.53  282.17  277.69  271.71
Small  238.89  236.68  233.70  229.64
All  farm  bid  prices  were  computed  assuming  a  risk  aversion  parameter  equal  to  .003.  Annual  returns  are
assumed to  grow at 9 percent.
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result when  capital  gains  considerations  are
excluded correspond to a smaller price differ-
ential  between  farm  sizes  as  the  tax  advan-
tage  to  larger farms  in higher  tax brackets  is
reduced.
Substitution  of net,  before-tax  income  of
the next lower-sized farm results in bid price
reductions  for  most  farm  size  comparisons.
Higher expected net income per acre for the
medium-sized  farm  adjusts  the bid price  for
the large farm upward.  Level of risk aversion
has no impact on bid price differentials  which
occur  with  an  adjustment  of  expected  net
income.  Price  differentials  between  farms
are,  however,  sensitive to risk behavior when
the variability  of net income per acre  is  sub-
stituted  between  farms  as  shown  in the  last
column in Table 4.  The higher standard devi-
ation of returns experienced by the medium-
sized farm  had the effect  of reducing the bid
price for the large  farm  class from  its former
level. Other bid prices are increased as lower
standard  deviations  of returns  for  adjacent,
smaller farms  are substituted.  Table 4 gener-
ally illustrates  that bid price differentials  are
sensitive  to the tax bracket of the farm.
To illustrate how sensitive bid prices  are to
the  tax rate variable,  prices  were  computed
for  each farm  assuming various  tax brackets.
Elasticities  of bid price  response  to  changes
in the marginal income  tax rate are  shown in
Table  5.  Assuming risk neutral  behavior,  all
farms  exhibit  identical  price  response  elas-
ticities  since  the  tax  rate  affects  net income
per acre and the discount rate proportionate-
ly,  and the variability  of returns  is  not con-
sidered.  Increases  in  the  tax  rate  result  in
higher elasticities of price response,  general-
ly,  and highly responsive  bid-price  increases
at tax rates between 35 and 40 percent.  High
tax bracket  land  buyers have  substantial  in-
centives  to invest in land under the assump-
tion of risk neutrality.
Computed  elasticities  under  an  assump-
tion of uniform  risk aversion provide  an indi-
cation  that  price  response  is  generally  re-
duced  by  the  incorporation  of  risk  averse
investor behavior.  Elasticities  shown for indi-
vidual farm  sizes  indicate  that at some  point
the elasticity may turn negative  as bid prices
decline  in  response  to  larger  reductions  in
after-tax  returns  per  acre.  Lower  after-tax
returns per  acre  at high  tax levels  affect bid
prices more than the reductions  in variability
of returns  and the after-tax  discount rate.
Conclusions  and Implications
A  representative  land  market  model  was
developed  by  integrating  the  asset  pricing
model  developed  by  Baker  into a  bid-price
theoretical  framework  introduced  by  Pratt
and  developed  for  farmland  by  Harris  and
Nehring.  The  resultant  model  incorporates
TABLE 5.  Elasticities of Bid Price Response to Changes  in the  Marginal  Federal  Income Tax
Rate  by Farm  Size  Class for North  Dakota  Cash  Grain Farms.
Farm  Size Classa
All  Large  Medium  Small/Medium  Small
Marginal
Federal  Income  Risk  Risk  Risk  Risk  Risk
Tax Rate  Neutral  Averse  Averse  Averse  Averse
.05  .05  .04  .04  .05  .05
.10  .12  .10  .09  .11  .11
.15  .21  .18  .16  .18  .19
.20  .33  .27  .24  .28  .30
.25  .51  .40  .32  .43  .45
.30  .76  .55  .36  .61  .65
.35  1.17  .64  -1.65  .85  .95
.40  1.86  -1.63  -2.91  .58  1.29
aBid  prices computed  under the assumption  of risk aversion  assumed a risk aversion  parameter  equal to  .003.
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growth of returns,  ordinary and  capital  gains
taxes,  finite  individual  investor  holding
periods,  and  explicit consideration  of econo-
mies and diseconomies  of size,  and risk. The
combined market  model allows for analysis of
an  increased  number  of factors  thought  to
affect  land investor  decisions.
Application  of the  model  to primary  data
from cash grain farms in northwest and north
central  North  Dakota  indicates  that  larger
farms  have  a competitive  bidding advantage
over  small-sized  farms  within the same  land
market.  The  model illustrates  that the effect
of increased marginal  tax rates on a perpetu-
al,  growing income  stream  is  to increase  the
present  value  of  that  stream.6 Higher  bid
prices for larger farms  in higher tax  brackets
stem  primarily  from  three  model  relation-
ships;  1) higher tax  rates reduce the after-tax
discount rate,  2)  higher tax  rates reduce  the
variability  of after-tax  net  returns  per  acre,
and 3) capital  gains tax provisions which allow
a portion of the increased  value of land to be
excluded  and  the  remainder  taxed  at  the
preferred  capital  gains  rate  provides  an  in-
centive  for  investors  in  higher  tax  brackets.
These  factors  increase  the  present  value  of
land  and,  therefore,  the bid-price.
Application  of  the  representative  market
model  to  cash  grain  farms  in  North  Dakota
also  indicates  that  diseconomies  of  size  (to
the degree and magnitude  that they are cap-
tured  by  data  on  expected  before-tax  net
returns  per  acre)  do  not  greatly  influence
land bid  prices.  Rather,  the  tax bracket  and
risk  aversion  level  of the  investor  are  more
important  determinants  of  farmland  bid
prices.  Implications  of  the  application  are
limited  by  the  omission  of  two  considera-
tions.  Form of business organization  has not
been considered in the analysis.  Partnerships
and  corporate  farm  organizations  may be  ef-
fective in reducing the progressiveness  of the
income  tax and diminish  the bid price differ-
'Conversely,  the  model  can  be  used  to  show  that  the
effect  of increased  marginal  tax  rates  on  a  perpetual,
declining  income  stream  is  to  decrease  the  present
value  of the land  resource.
entials  indicated  above.  Secondly,  financing
terms  have  not  been  incorporated  into  the
model.  Variations  in financing  arrangements
would  be  conceptually  difficult  to  model
when considering  a series  of owners.
Generally,  the impact of increasingly  risk-
averse  investor  behavior  is  to  increase  the
risk premium  and decrease  the bid-price  for
farmland.  At relatively  low uniform levels  of
risk aversion large farms outbid smaller farm-
ing units.  Higher  uniform levels  of risk aver-
sion favor  smaller farms,  which exhibit lower
variability  of  net  returns  per  acre.  When
decreasing  absolute  risk aversion  (as  a func-
tion of net worth)  was assumed larger  farms
demonstrated  a  competitive  advantage  over
smaller farms  in bidding for land.  Bid prices
generated by gradually raising  the tax  brack-
et for individual farm  sizes indicated that the
effect  of  taxes  under  risk-neutral  investor
behavior  is  to increase  the  elasticity  of bid-
price response.  Increases  in the tax rate vari-
able  under  risk,  however,  indicate  that  at
some point  the  bid-price for  land  begins  to
decline.  These  results  differ  substantially
from those  generated  in other farmland bid-
price  model applications.
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Appendix
Given the present value expression  for the
first buyer  in equation  (3),  it is necessary  to
show  that  an  equivalent  expression  can  be
derived  for  the  (i + l)th  owner.  Following
Baker,  equation (3)  can  be rewritten  as,
(Al)  Vo (1-c (1+r)-m)=
The price expression for the (i + l)th buyer is,
therefore,
(A3)  Vi (1-c (1 +r)- m ) =
m  Ri  V+  l  (1  -c)
I  +
n=l  (1 + r*)n  (1 + r)m
under  the  assumption  that all  buyers  in  the
sequence  hold  land  for  m-periods  and  have
the same discount rate,  and income tax rate.
The  price  to  the  (i+l)th buyer  can  be
rewritten  in a simple  form as,
(A4)
where,
Vi=ot  Ri +  Vi+l
1-(l+r*)- m
r*  (1 - c(  + r) - m)
=  (1-c) (l+r)- m
(1-c(1 + r) -m)
Analogously,  the present value expression for
Vo  is,
(A5) Vo=ot Ro+O V1
m  Ro  (1 - c)  V
E  +
n=l  (  + r*)n  (1+  r)m
The price paid by the second  buyer  is  then,







(1  + r)m
Recursively  substituting for  Vi  on  the  right
side of (A5)  until  the  number  of buyers be-
comes quite  large,
(A6)
00
Vo = o  E  iRi
i=O
Equation  6  states  that  as  the  sequence  of
landowners  become  quite  long  the  present
value  of  land  is  approximated  by  the  se-
quence  of  discounted  annual  after-tax  re-
turns.  Substituting the value  of Ri  from  (A2)
into  (A6),  the  revised  present  value  ex-
pression is,
where,  Ri = Ro  (1 + g)im
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(A7)  Vo=a Ro  R  (O(1+g)m)i
i=O
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To  simplify  (A7)  the  limit  of the  right  side
expression  is  taken  to  define  the  present
value  for the first buyer as,
(A8)  Vo  a Ro
I - O(1 +g)m
Substitution  for  a  and  0  from  (A4),  and
simplification  of  the  resulting  equation
yields,
(A9)  VO=  I  1
r
1- (l+r*)-m  1 c(1  + r*) - m -c(l + r)-  m
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